University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1949

The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization
Walter J. Blum

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walter J. Blum, "The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization," 17 University of Chicago Law
Review 565 (1949).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

THE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
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NUMBER 4

THE LAW AND LANGUAGE OF CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
WALTER

J. B1m*

ORPORATE REORGANIZATION under the National Bankruptcy Act is a process of dealing with the rights of those having financial commitments in distressed corporations. It is primarily concerned with the rights of investors-shareholders and bondholders and other lenders. It also acts upon the rights of merchandise
and similar creditors and occasionally even treats some of these tradesmen as involuntary or disguised investors. But, in the main, security
contracts that embody the rights of investors are the basic raw material of reorganization. The process itself has been largely fashioned to
conform to the principal characteristics of these contracts. It is hardly
understandable when approached from any other direction.
Corporate security contracts in our society have several attributes
which are reflected in the reorganization process. In all of them the
rights of holders and the corresponding obligations of corporations are
expressed in dollar quantities. No provision is made for these magnitudes to vary with fluctuations in the value of the dollar itself. This fact
is especially significant in that most security contracts with creditors
impose unconditional obligations on the corporation to make interest
and maturity payments in dollars without reference to the company's
ability to perform. Failure to pay at the time specified ordinarily results in a default regardless of surrounding circumstances or the purchasing power of the dollar. Usually the contracts spell out in detail the
rights to which corporate creditors will be entitled if a default occurs.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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The pattern of these rights invariably rests on the pretension that
creditors will obtain payment through the old common-law routine of
selling the company's assets at auction and applying the proceeds in
satisfaction of the debts.
But, despite the traditional default provisions which continue to appear in security contracts, the rights of creditors and others on default
are not settled in the specified fashion. The development away from enforcement by the typical judgment and execution procedure, and the
invention of the equity receivership as a substitute, is a familiar story
not needing another restatement. It is sufficient to note that two main
principles emerged from the development, and that they constitute the
framework for our existing. system of reorganization. One is that the
assets of a distressed business are not to be disposed of until there has
been a reasonable opportunity to determine what disposition will be
most advantageous. This principle is so clearly sound that elaboration
is unnecessary. The other is that the market value of a distressed business or its assets is not to govern the rights of those financially interested in the company. More particularly the creditors are not to foreclose and force a sale or valuation of assets at prevailing market prices.
Instead junior interests are to be protected from forced sales and the
impact of unfavorable market conditions. It is the fulfillment of this
principle which has produced the primary substantive content of our
reorganization system.
Abandonment or avoidance of the market in reorganizations has been
explained in a number of ways. The most general explanation is that
ordinarily no pertinent market exists. Large distressed corporations
cannot be sold intact,' and selling them piecemeal changes the commodity by destroying whatever value arises because a concern is a going
thing and not a random collection of assets.' These assertions are said
to be especially realistic in times of widespread economic depression,
x"Of course, numerous... reasons may make for a decision to reorganize rather than
liquidate.... [A] corporation may be so large that its sale would bring forth not merely inadequate bids, but no bids at all. It is commonplace that a railroad cannot be sold like a suburban
acre." SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and
Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part VIII, at 7 (1940).
2The contention that piecemeal sale of a business destroys its going concern value often
contains an ambiguity. Generally it is a sound point to make against permitting unplanned
dismantling of a company brought about as a result of individual actions by creditors to
enforce their rights upon default. But it has a different thrust, and lacks soundness, once a
procedure has been established for holding the assets of the business together until a comprehensive decision as to its future can be made. See First National Bank v. Flershem, 29 0 U.S.
304 (1933). Moreover, a business can be sold "piecemeal" by flotation of securities to the
public without providing any impact on the organizational value of the concern.
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and such slumps have usually coincided with large waves of defaults by
particular companies. Our railroads, which periodically have been in
financial difficulties, are most frequently used to illustrate the explanation. A troubled road, it is said, cannot be sold for more than a token
sum because it is too big to sell in one piece and too integrated to break
up into smaller units. The proof of its unsalability consists of pointing
out why it would be difficult to find a purchaser. From this muster a
pair of observations or assertions emerge: Rarely does any one person
or private group have the wealth to finance acquisition of a railroad,
while a public sale through flotation of new securities is impractical inasmuch as individual investors are said to be averse to buying into a
distressed road. Sometimes this display is qualified by noting that certain "syndicates" or "speculators" conceivably could be interested in
purchasing. But then they are dismissed from consideration presumably
as not constituting a legitimate or proper market for such a sale.
It is obvious that a distressed enterprise or its assets can be sold at
some price. That is impliedly acknowledged when potential offerors are
labelled speculators. It is equally plain that the public would finance a
purchase if the terms were advantageous as compared to alternative investment possibilities. But the effective sale price might be very low as
judged by those who already have a jeopardized financial commitment
in the company. This judgment is at the bottom of another explanation
for by-passing the market: Even if there is a market for distressed corporations it is too thin to be meaningful and in times of economic slump
it is too chaotic to be fair. According to this approach the market prices
are low not because the distressed companies are of relatively little
worth; they are low because not enough investors are interested in buying into troubled businesses and even the interested ones have unreasonable doubts about such enterprises.3 A variety of observations are gathered to show why those who make the market seldom give a distressed
company a break. It is said that potential investors are unduly disturbed about the effects of temporary financial difficulty and of insolvency proceedings on the future of a troubled business. They have
doubts whether the firm can hold (or regain) its customers, make satisfactory arrangements with suppliers, or obtain suitable management.
They are apt to lack confidence in the old directing group and at the
same time question the seasoning of any prospective new one. These
3 This summarization of the position omits all reference to monetary panic and conditions
associated with it. The contentions which are rested on the ramifications of monetary panic
can be made about the market for almost everything.
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and similar conjectures could be elaborated at length. Their common
denomination is clear. Investors are likely to be less optimistic about a
business in trouble than about a prospering company.
Another explanation for shelving the market in reorganizations
builds upon the previous one. Senior investors4 whose claims are in default ordinarily will not be satisfied, it is said, with the prices obtainable
through a sale of the business to outsiders in a thin market. Instead
they will usually prefer to bid in their claims and thereby take over the
distressed enterprise.' In practice few defaulting large corporations
have been sold to outsiders for new money; they have been reorganized
by invalidating some or all of the rights of junior investors and distributing equivalent rights to the old senior claimants. Under such an
arrangement the market price of the company or its property is said to
have little significance because no real sale is involved or contemplated.
The contention usually has been clothed in more flavorful terms. Bidding for the debtor or its assets is likened to "chilled" bidding because
seniors can bid with their unvalued claims, while cash is required of all
others. With cash purchasers deterred and with senior creditors bidding
claims of undetermined worth, a double conclusion is drawn: a market
price is neither ascertainable nor significant.
This reasoning was widely circulated and accepted but its weakness
is not to go unnoticed. The bid chilling analogy can be made about all
kinds of defaulted debts; in fact it has been applied almost without discrimination to debts ranging from huge corporate obligations to tiny
home mortgages. Closely examined the underlying argument is never
more than a commonplace. When the market price of property is substantially below the amount of defaulted claims running against it, the
lien creditors often prefer taking over the property to receiving the
market price in cash. To ascribe a scarcity of cash bidders to the ability
of creditors to bid in their claims is to miss the important relationship.
Bidding is cooled off only in the sense that the market forces-the potential cash purchasers-value the property considerably below the face
4 The terms "senior investors" and "junior investors" (or "seniors" and "juniors") are
employed without precise definition. The contexts should make the intended references sufficiently clear. The fact that in a particular case the juniors are creditors rather than shareholders, or vice versa, is generally of no importance for the analysis.

s"[The creditors could themselves purchase the property at the sale. If the sale was to
have value for them, it had to do more than attract purchasers at any price. It had to attract
purchasers willing to pay enough for the assets to make the creditor willing to let the property
go.... In times of financial depression such sales could be expected to bring out buyers with
only low or nominal bids.. . ." SEC, op. cit. supra note i, at 6-7.
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amount of the creditors' claims. More cash bidders would appear if
creditors refrained from bidding with claims. This, however, is only a
roundabout way of saying that cash purchasers would be attracted if
creditors were willing to accept the market price for the property with
which they are secured.
The explanations advanced for ignoring market values of distressed
companies are useful in understanding our reorganization system, but
their soundness was not the decisive factor in molding that system.'
The prevailing pressure was to relieve junior corporate investors from
those senior contracts which had turned out disastrously for them.
This pressure was only a single facet of the broader drive to relax strict
enforcement of all bargains which sympathetic bystanders felt were
harsh. That drive in turn was but one manifestation of the wider movement away from reliance on the market place to arbitrate economic rewards and penalties. Sympathy for losers apparently combined with
mistrust and misunderstanding of the market mechanism to furnish
special rescue for many endangered equities. Seasoning the combination
was the recurringly popular notion that economic slumps are temporary
and therefore the settlement of rights at depressed prices which exist
during them is unfair to junior interests. This ingredient became more
potent as the government was increasingly expected to take positive
measures to reverse economic declines. Most of those who favored such
action also favored channelling its benefits to harassed debtors or juniors
rather than to creditors or seniors whom they apparently regarded as
less deserving.
The pressure to undo security contracts was met by a counterforce.
Direct resistance was offered by many senior groups seeking to secure
the advantages of their bargains. In addition lawmakers and courts
generally recognized that in a credit economy financial pacts cannot be
disturbed too much without seriously impairing the entire credit structure. Constitutional limitations moreover seemed to coincide with the
demands for honoring security contracts. The impact of the various
competing forces called for a political compromise. The result was an
almost self-contained system of corporate reorganization.
6The text summarizes the major explanations for not permitting the market to govern
rights in reorganizations and points out their weaknesses. It does not consider the question
whether the market mechanism would or could be made to work well in the reorganization
environment. The reason for this apparent one-sidedness is that understanding the dissatisfaction with valuation by the market is important in understanding the reorganization system
which we have developed. A discussion of the potentialities of the market is not a requisite to
analyzing that system.
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The essential parts of the system perhaps might easily have been
foreseen. Since market value was ruled out, a substitute standard of
measurement had to be devised. For psychological and constitutional
reasons the new gauge would be named to convey the impression that
it measures "value." Probably the first appropriate name that comes to
mind is "reorganization value." The quantity represented by this
label is that which is to be apportioned among possible claimants. But
the allocation must not seem arbitrary and accordingly canons of fairness for a plan of distribution are needed. These ought to stress upholding contractual priorities among classes of security contracts in order to
emphasize that contracts are being enforced and not ignored. Obviously
it would be embarrassing if the rehabilitated company soon ran into
distress again. To prevent that from happening reorganization plans
must be workable; the synonym "feasible" suggests itself as a label for
this idea because it pairs better with "fair" and sounds less mundane.
The entire reorganization process should appear to remain democratic
in a democratic society. Accordingly those having a financial stake in
the distressed company ought to vote on the important questions that
arise during the proceedings. However, there may be some irreconcilable
differences between investor groups having conflicting interests. To
avoid everlasting stalemates someone must have power to resolve the
issues by cramming a plan down the pockets of one side or the other.
This is a task naturally cut out for a judge. Finally the whole process
should seem to be predicated on principles and not on arbitrary actions.
Inasmuch as the principles must be created, it is advisable to have a
group of experts on hand. These conveniently can be collectively called
an "administrative agency."
The compromise between enforcing and relaxing security contracts
of course did become embodied in such a reorganization system. It now
may be looked upon, for analytical convenience, as having three key
doctrinal aspects: reorganization value; the fair and feasible plan; and
the cram-down power. To analyze corporate reorganizations under the
National Bankruptcy Act we have to consider the content given each of
these concepts by the courts and the administrative agencies. 7 Their
7The analysis in this article primarily concerns reorganizations under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), as amended, ii U.S.C.A. § So et seq. (1946); and its
predecessor, Section 77B, 48 Stat. 912 (1934). A large part equally concerns reorganizations
under Section 77 of the Act, 47 Stat. 1474 (1033), as amended, xi U.S.C.A. § 205 (x946). The
Securities and Exchange Commission is the administrative agency under Chapter X; the Interstate Commerce Commission is the agency under Section 77.
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products currently comprise the basic law and language of corporate
reorganization.'
Reorganization value is the substitute for market value in reorganization. Perhaps market value was never actually permitted to govern
rights in corporate reorganizations. It is unimportant whether the reorganization process was or was not identifiable as such by the time market value was replaced in this area (if in fact it ever even gained a foothold). But there is no doubt that reorganization value now occupies the
role comparable to that which market value otherwise would have performed.9 Basically it purports to determine what classes of claimants
are entitled to be satisfied in whole or part out of the assets of the distressed company. This it does by seeming to measure what classes are
8There is a fourth very important aspect of the reorganization system. But it is not on the
same plane as the others. In a sense it is not a component of reorganization theory but is the
machinery of reorganization. It consists of all the procedural steps and techniques which affect
the relative effective strength that the different classes are able to exert. A representative
list of these elements should indicate the range of factors comprehended by this aspect of the
system: (i) control over initiation of the proceedings; (2) management of the company during
the proceedings; (3) availability of lists of security holders; (4) access to the records and books
of the business; (5) power and function of committees; (6) authority to draw up plans; (7)
control over statements furnished security holders; (8) circumstances surrounding submission
of plans to security holders; (9) nature and extent of judicial inquiry during the proceedings.
Many of the changes introduced by Section 77B and Chapter X were designed to redress the
distortions of comparative strength that had developed under equity receivership reorganizations. The statutory changes sought to eliminate artificial advantages gained from procedural
phases of the reorganization process. The new procedure was thought to be more democratic in that the relative strength of the groups was expected to reflect more accurately the
attitudes of their proper constituents, and it was hoped that the attitudes themselves would
reflect intelligent deliberation based on adequate information and competent advice.
Much of the criticism of Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act (no longer in effect) was
directed at its procedural contours, which tended to place great leverage in the hands of the
management, and thus of junior interests, of railroad companies. A comparison of the structures
of Chapter X and Chapter XV highlights such criticism. See Will, The Voluntary Adjustment
of Railroad Obligations, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5i9 (i94o).

9 To analyze reorganization value by contrasting it to market value, as is done in this
article, may not be conventional. Moreover this approach has the drawback of tending to
emphasize valuations and to direct attention away from the processes of determining the
rights of the parties. These disadvantages might have been avoided by casting the analysis
in terms of contrasting the "foreclosure principle" with the "adjustment principle." This
alternative would not have altered the analysis substantively; the foreclosure process determines rights on the basis of market values while the adjustment process does so on the basis
of values fixed by experts-now called reorganization values. However, on balance the alternative seemed less attractive than the approach adopted. The market value-reorganization value
distinction appears to be more flexible and to provide a less cramping frame of reference. The
idea of market value is fairly crisp while the notion of foreclosure has acquired a cluster of
overtones that might be distracting. Finally, the use of an unconventional orientation may
assist in gaining further insights about corporate reorganization.
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to participate in the reorganized entity and what ones are to be left out.
Reorganization value might be used in two other connections in the
reorganization process. It might be referred to in determining whether
a proposed allocation of interests among participants in the reorganized
company is fair and equitable. It also might be consulted in deciding
whether the business should be sold--either as a going concern or as
scrap-or reorganized. These various functions which reorganization
value can be made to perform will become more clearly delineated as
the full scheme of reorganization doctrine is unfolded.
The difference between market value and reorganization value is a
touchstone for analyzing the reorganization system. Market value is
a real value in that it not only is expressible in dollar terms but is realizable in dollars. Property can always be exchanged for cash at market
price because that price is made by those who are ready and willing to
back up their own estimates of value with money. For the same reason
market value can always be ascertained objectively by noting the highest bid. In marked contrast, reorganization value has the opposite characteristics. It is a fictional value which cannot command real money
dollar for dollar. It is set by the estimates of persons who are not standing back of them with a willingness to invest their own funds. Accordingly it can never be objectively ascertained or verified but always remains in the realm of opinion or belief.1"
Nevertheless the need for making reorganization values appear objective and realistic had to be met. A related need also invited attention. Almost everyone was agreed in the abstract that there could be
better or worse valuations for reorganization purposes. Canons therefore were required to guide setting reorganization values at the better
rather than the worse levels. The twin goals of gaining an objective
appearance and adopting proper canons could be satisfied at once
through borrowing techniques developed in the market place. Intelligent
and prudent investors are known to analyze and make judgments about
various separable and describable factors in reaching an appraisal of a
company or its securities. By imitating these steps in finding reorganization value this comparatively new concept might acquire stature by
seeming associated closely with market value. In time the two "values,"
arrived at by similar techniques, might tend to become merged in popular thought.
10 This comparison between reorganization value and market value suggests that the problem of finding a proper reorganization value is like that of finding a proper rate to be charged
by a public utility for its services.
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The imitation of investor practices resulted in crystallizing the calculation of reorganization value into an approved procedure that formally involves making three guesses." The first is an estimate of the
2
annual income which the business hereafter most probably will earn.1
This guess is to be reduced to a yearly average after consideration has
been given to foreseeable highs and lows for the business. The crystal
gazing of course must be bottomed on facts, and therefore it is to be
a projection of the company's past and present, rather than mere fancy
about its future. The facts however are likely to be slippery and plastic.
Past earnings of the business may suggest something about its future,
but there cannot reasonably be a presumption that the historical pattern will continue substantially unchanged. Current earnings are perhaps even better indicators, but if the enterprise is experiencing hard
times a low level of earnings can invariably be explained away easily.
In a changing world there will almost always be adjustments which can
or should be made to past or current earnings to reflect the direction of
change. Doubtless some predictions as to future earnings may seem
more prudent than others; the range of reasonable predictions, however, appears usually to be extremely wide.
The second guess pertains to the probable life of the business as a
going concern after reorganization. Often this matter is not in issue because the parties agree that the foreseeable operational life is sufficiently long to justify valuing the entity as a perpetuity. 13 But where there
rI Of course the valuation technique described in the text is not the only one that is used
in bankruptcy reorganizations. There are situations in which valuation by the capitalization
of projected earnings is not suitable. However, it is fairly realistic to view the method discussed
in the text as the standard operating procedure which has general official sanction. Other approaches to valuation by and large do not have a comparable status in reorganizations; it almost seems as though they must be specially justified in particular cases before being acceptable for such limited service.
The techniques followed by the SEC in Chapter X cases and by the ICC in Section 77
cases are not identical. The SEC estimates future earnings, chooses a capitalization rate, and
then (after considering the prospective life of the enterprise) mechanically applies one to the
other to compute reorganization value. The ICC estimates future earnings but usually does not
explicitly consider a capitalization rate or compute a specific reorganization value. Instead it
calculates how large a capitalization can be supported by the estimated earnings. This is an
indirect method of arriving at a rate for capitalizing the estimated earnings. The difference
between the two techniques has no significant bearing upon this analysis.
12 For a discussion of estimating prospective earnings see i Bonbright, Valuation of Property, c. xii (i937).

X3One difference in the problems confronting the SEC under Chapter X and the ICC under
Section 77 should be noted. In railroad reorganizations the ICC can generally assume that the
roads will have perpetual life. The SEC often cannot take for granted that the life span of a
distressed industrial corporation will be of long duration. See Field, Valuation for the Purpose
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is a question whether the business will be able to continue operations
for an extensive period, a fairly specific prediction about its duration is
needed to compute its reorganization value or, more accurately, its delayed liquidation value. Making this estimate might be largely a technical undertaking where the limiting feature for continuation of the business is exhaustion of an asset not being replaced, such as a mineral
deposit or a determinate franchise. It is otherwise where the limit is
suggested by doubts about the firm's ability to finance replacement of
necessary equipment which is or might soon become obsolete. A guess
about continuation of the business under these circumstances necessarily involves assumptions as to replacement costs, the rate of technical
change in the industry, the replacement program of competitive firms,
and other factors of a similar nature. On these matters agreement

among the technicians is neither likely nor very persuasive.
The third guess, which generally is most consequential, consists of
14
picking a proper rate at which to capitalize the projected earnings.
This endeavor presents a double puzzler. On the one hand the rate
cannot be obtained from a review of the capitalization rates for the
distressed enterprise itself which are implicit in the ratio between its
earnings and the evaluation of the company (or its securities) by investors. 5 Its current rate (that is, its earnings-valuation ratio) is fixed
of Corporate Reorganization, 16 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 13 (1943); Field, Strict-Priority-of-LiensPolicy of Federal Agencies, 9 Am. L. School Rev. I518 (1942).
Regarding the difference between valuing a business as a perpetuity and as an entity with a
specified limited life, see Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941); cf. the majority and minority opinions in Palmer v. Conn. Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544 (i941).
14 The following references discuss the problems of selecting an appropriate capitalization
rate: Valuation by the SEC in Reorganizations, s5 Harv. L. Rev. 125 (i94); Gardner, The
SEC and. Valuation under Chapter X, 9i U. of Pa. L. Rev. 44o (1943); 1 Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations, Bk. 2, cc. 1, 2 ( 4 th ed. 1941).
Simplification plans under the Public Utility Holding Company Act frequently entail a
valuation process similar to that employed in reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act.
The simplification cases, however, seem to present easier targets for making guesses as to
future earnings and proper capitalization rates. The income of gas and electric utilities over the
years has been, and is likely to continue to be, more stable than that of industrial concerns and
railroads. Utility operations are characterized by a greater degree of similarity than is found
among industrial concerns, and hence comparability between firms might more readily be
found. Moreover, the company undergoing simplification is usually not financially distressed
in the same sense as enterprises involved in insolvency proceedings. For this reason the market
capitalization rates for the subject company may be thought to be more significant in choosing
aproper capitalization rate. See, for example, American & Foreign Power Co., SEC Holding
Co. Act Release No. 785i (X947).
15In a reorganization the term "capitalization rate" is an orderly one for referring to the
relationship between earnings (estimated) and valuation. This is so because the reorganizers
are attempting to reach a valuation; if they start with predicted earnings the earnings must
be capitalized at a rate to obtain the valuation. But the term is not such an orderly one for
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by the current market and that institution has been cast aside as a
standard for measuring values in reorganizations. For the same reason
its rates (or ratios) in the near past cannot be meaningful because the
imminent or actual distress of the business almost certainly then affected its capitalization. Its rates in a more rosy past are likely to be
only of historical interest because times and the corporation probably
have changed. On the other hand the spread of capitalization rates
(again meaning earnings-valuation ratios) for similar or competing
businesses during these various time periods seems to afford equally
little data upon which to base selection of the rate. Most businesses
do not have twins. Similar or competing firms may range from highly
successful concerns to others undergoing the reorganization treatment.
An average rate of all such firms is meaningless for the purpose in view,
while individual comparisons are somewhat circular because the very
factor which is being sought-the rate-is likely to be influential in deciding what firms are' comparable. Once the yardstick companies have
been designated there again arises the question whether it is their past
or present rates which are significant. Inasmuch as rates determined by
the market fluctuate frequently, the capitalization rate which prevailed
at any one time-that is, a spot rate-appears to be useful only as a
component in a large series of spot rates which go to make up the average rate for some fairly extensive interval. At best the guessers can fall
back only on average long-run capitalization rates for each of the corporations which they feel is more or less comparable to the one being
rehabilitated.
This cursory review of the guesses which go into reorganization value
indicates that all three have similar characteristics. Being guesses they
of course cannot possess certainty. But each appears closely dependent
upon factors that can be reduced to at least near certainty. Furthermore each can be "explained" and expressed in precise mathematical
terms. As a result each seems open to reasonably accurate prediction
by competent experts. In fact, however, these appearances are highly
deceptive. All three objects of the guesses (with the exception of estimating the life of depleting or depreciating assets in some cases) conceivably may be affected by innumerable circumstances, including the
referring to'the market relationship between earnings and valuation. Both these factors are
given; andtherefore the term "earnings-valuation ratio" or "times-earnings ratio" is more
descriptive. To avoid shifting terms unnecessarily, however, the text uses "capitalization rate"
to designate generally the relationship between valuation and earnings, whether actual or
projected.
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guesses themselves. Expert guessers, with divergent backgrounds, surely will differ in appraising the implications of possibly relevant factors.
It is manifestly impossible to lay down in advance rules that determine
the proper weight to be assigned the various circumstances in particular cases. Only broad and general pronouncements can be beamed at
the guessers. These directives are the official guides for making the
guesses and thereby arriving at reorganization value. Our short description of the guesses is tantamount to a rough summary and paraphrase of
those guides.
Accompanying the three-part estimate there is a one-part necessary
assumption in calculating reorganization value which the authorized
guides do not mention. It deals with the future state of our economy
and in the cases it is usually implied rather than expressed. Because
reorganization value concerns future conditions, something must be
assumed as to the future general level of economic activity and the
future real worth of the monetary unit. This poses a problem: the objective and scientific appearance of the valuation process must be preserved notwithstanding the fact that there are no experts in the game
of peering into our over-all economic future. The solution evidently is
to wrap up the critical assumption in vagueness and bury it. In most
reorganization cases it probably is assumed that the economic future
will be much like the economic past-without being too careful about
designating how much or what part of the past. If the past which the
calculator deems relevant strikes him as too gloomy or too bright an
atmosphere for the future, he is likely to make adjustments through
altering the projected earnings or capitalization rate for the particular
firm.16 In this way a guess as to the general economic future is translated into specific estimates about the distressed enterprise undergoing
reorganization. The shift, in effect, keeps the crucial guess in the
province reserved for (or by) experts and thereby maintains the illusion that reorganization value is being determined on a sound foundation.
,6 In the sense that the future earnings of a firm cannot be estimated as though it is to be
operated in a vacuum, the assumption about general economic conditions is not separate from
the guess as to earnings. However, there is a conceptual difference between the general economic outlook and that for the particular company. To illustrate: it is possible to make a
series of guesses as to the company's future, each being tied to a different assumption about
general conditions. In any event it is possible to state separately the assumption about the
general future. See, for example, the argument made in the Denver & Rio Grande Western
reorganization that a "permanent elevation of the National income" involved "for the indefinite future a greatly increased demand for railway transportation." Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 329 U.S. 607, 6io (1947).
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A troublesome but central question doubtless has been intruding.
The guiding formula for finding reorganization value is a copy of that
used by careful and informed investors. Presumably the copywork was
accurate. Why then should anyone duplicate the valuation work which
is independently and simultaneously being undertaken anyway by numerous investors with sharp pencils? Surely the risk-free imitators are
not that much more proficient than their risk-bearing models. The correct answer is not so simple and it lies nearer the core of the reorganization process. A clue might be furnished by the frequent assertion that
reorganization value is unlike market value in that the latter is a spot
or immediate value while the former is a long-run average value. This
is the premise for a basic tenet of reorganization doctrine: Market
value, especially in depressed times, is to have little weight since rights
in a distressed company are to be adjusted in the light of an average
or long-range value which takes account of both possible future highs
and possible future lows. 1 7 Valuation for reorganization thus is sup-

posed to aim at reaching the long-range average of future market valuations of the enterprise. So the answer to the troublesome question
might seem to be that experts on reorganization value are not aiming
at the same target as professional investors who make the market.
But such an answer is built on an error. Investors who make the spot
prices are themselves attempting to predict the future long-run or average values of particular companies. Their judgments as to present
values are derived from their predictions as to comparative future
values of alternative investment opportunities. This may be a more
helpful clue to finding the correct answer to the question. Investors
focus on predicting the future of a company in order to compare a
present investment in it with other possible immediate investments.
Current market prices are obviously of utmost importance to them in
calculating the relative attractiveness of opportunities. In contrast, appraisers of reorganization value usually seem not much concerned with
the present range of market prices. They apparently make their guesses
z7 "It has been [the] practice [of the Interstate Commerce Commission] broadly speaking

to make an estimate of prospective earnings divided roughly into four categories: (i)
Those reasonably certain to continue without serious interruption .... (2) Those of which
there is a substantial p robability but whose regular annual continuance cannot be counted upon
in a period of general business depression.... (3) Those of which there is a reasonable probability but which... may be frequently interrupted.... (4) Those of which there is no probability of uninterrupted realization but which will probably be realized from time to time, and if
optimistic hopes are fulfilled, may ultimately be maintained." Swaine, A Decade of Railroad
Reorganization under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1037, at
...

,198-99 (1943).

HeinOnline -- 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 577 1949-1950

578

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

as to future values without attempting to relate them definitely to the
existing structure of market values. Instead the appraisers generally
act as though the predicted future values are the present values. The
essence of reorganization value can now be restated in other terms:
Reorganization value is what some appraisers believe the current market value of the distressed company ought to be if the present were
like the future they foresee. It is thus a liberalization of market price
corresponding with some expert opinions about the inherent value of the
8
enterprise.1
Though reorganization value is in a world apart from market value
the two realms are never completely isolated from each other. Securities of the reorganized company will be independently priced by the

market regardless of how they were valued for purposes of the reorganization. In the period immediately following reorganization, and for
some indefinite time thereafter, it is to be expected that in the aggregate the new securities will sell below the values assigned them in the
reorganization. That is, the total of market prices will fall substantially
short of the total of their par or stated or face values. These nominal'9
18This may seem to be an overstatement but it is a statement of a point which needs
emphasis. It is at the root of the inflation of reorganization value to exceed market value. It
explains why, in the large majority of reorganizations, the new securities do not have market
values equal to their nominal values (as defined in note xg infra).
It may be objected that the SEC, in reorganizations under Chapter X, endeavors to reach
a "realistic" reorganization value which takes account of existing economic and market conditions. There are numerous indications that the Commission has been more hard-headed than
other experts and appraisers who have figured in the cases. See, for example, Iield, Valuation
for the Purpose of Corporate Reorganization, 16 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. x3, 23 (1943): "(The SEC
used two approaches which simultaneously and cumulatively reduced the valuation for reorganization purposes. That is, (i)it made very conservative estimates of future earnings, and
(2) it applied a relatively high interest rate in capitalizing the scaled down earnings." Compare
Valuation by the SEC in Reorganizations, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 125, 132 (1941): "In summary
..it may be said, that, in the light of past and current earnings records, its determination
of prospective earnings appears to have been unduly optimistic." But being hard-headed in
figuring out reorganization value is not equivalent to seeking to ascertain what price the market woud place on the distressed business. In this connection see the statement regarding SEC
policy in note 24 infra.
A reminder might be useful at this juncture. The present analysis is not intended to demonstrate or suggest that market prices and values would or could work satisfactorily in governing rights in corporate reorganizations. In any event the attempt to use market values for that
purpose would raise a large number of problems which either are not mentioned or are passed
over lightly in this piece. Market values and prices are utilized here to analyze the reorganization value concept. See note 6 supra.
'
19The phrase "nominal amount or "nominal value" may be an unfortunate choice but no
other short one seems to convey the meaning intended. The phrase is employed to designate
the computational amount assigned to a claim or interest regardless of its actual dollar value.
It refers to the following: (i) the face amount of bonds or other creditor claims, intluding interest in default; (2) the par value of preferred shares, plus arrearages; (3)the artificial value assigned to common shares in working out the allocation of securities in a reorganization.
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values at the outset will be discounted because of the very factors which
produced the "low" prices that led to discarding market value of the
business as the standard for determining the rights of the parties upon
default. In time the security prices should, on the whole, approximate
nominal values if the guesses and assumption behind the calculation of
reorganization value turn out to be fairly close to reality. The new securities, in other words, should approach becoming wholly sound to the
extent the figure chosen for reorganization value happens to be a sound
estimate.
The need for a warning makes advisable a short digression. While
the market prices of the securities of a reorganized company are a link
between reorganization value and market value of the business, the
market prices of the company's securities prior to reorganization cannot
act as a comparable link. If reorganization value were set with an eye
toward market quotations on the pre-reorganization securities the valuation process would become circular. Market quotations would affect
reorganization value; that usually would affect the terms of the reorganization plan; that in turn usually would affect the treatment of the
old securities in the reorganization and therefore affect market quotations on the old securities. Only after the reorganization plan has
become definite and firm can the link between market value and reorganization value be formed. The link, moreover, will always have an
inherent shortcoming. The market value of a business as a unit is generally not identical with the aggregate market prices of the securities
issued by it. But this discrepancy does not seriously impair the reach
of our analysis. It is enough that the two figures ordinarily tend to
move in the same direction and on the average are not likely to be
widely apart over a long time span.2
These collateral observations concerning reorganization value should
not obscure the main point about the concept. Not only is it different
from valuation by the market, but it can be understood fully only when
contrasted with market value. A sharp reminder of the contrast is supplied by the case of a distressed holding company which owns nothing
but relatively small blocks of publicly traded securities of enterprises
not undergoing reorganization .2 The market value of the company's
20 The uses and shortcomings of the stock-and-bond method of appraising a company are
considered in x Bonbright, Valuation of Property 244-49 (i937). The position taken in this
article is not inconsistent with the observations of Bonbright.
2%
The problem of valuing holding company assets, both those in small and those in substantial lots, is considered by the SEC in its advisory report on plans to reorganize the Central
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assets can be ascertained immediately and accurately by referring to
present quotations, and the market value of the company itself obviously is the sum of those values. To assign a higher amount as reorganization value is to assume that the company's officers will manage its
assets more profitably than investors believe these or similar assets will
or can be managed. The evident brashness of that assumption is a deterrent to departing from market values in such a situation. In the more
usual reorganization the market values of the debtor's assets, treated
either individually or as a going business, are not so easily or surely or
definitely determinable. To use a reorganization value greater than the
best gauged market value is not as jarring in these circumstances. But
doing so nevertheless assumes that the debtor's officers will perform
better, or that general economic conditions will be better, than is
believed likely by those who make the market.
III
Apart from the over-all valuation issue, questions of fairness about a
reorganization plan arise principally because there is an uncertain ratio
between reorganization value and market value, and so between a dollar
of reorganization currency and a real dollar. If reorganizations were
predicated on real dollars, presumably cash or its equivalent in securities would be allocated to claimants in the amounts and order of their
contractual priorities. With claims being satisfied in this manner the
fair allocation could be worked out mechanically. However no objectively gauged allocation is possible when the medium of distribution
is reorganization currency of unknown dollar value. Such currency
must consist of new securities in the distressed company; but a unit
of one possible kind of new security (e.g., a $ioo bond) is not equivalent to the same denomination of another possible variety of new seStates Electric Corporation, an investment company, under Chapter X. Experts brought in by
junior interests contended "that the then current market prices were an undervaluation of the
public utility securities held by the Debtor... ; that there were favorable factors in the case
of these public utilities which were not fully appreciated by the investing public, or if appreciated, were accorded too great a discount in relation to the risks involved." The SEC's
comment upon this approach was that "conjecture as to future market prices is not a sound
basis upon which to measure the rights of creditors and stockholders. Under the circumstances
it is difficult to see how the Court can speculate that market prices of these securities will rise
in the future." Central States Electric Corp., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 82, at 89 (1949).
A different attitude was displayed by the court in the reorganization of Warren Brothers
Company, which owned a large number of bonds issued by the Cuban Republic. In deciding
that the bonds should be valued at par rather than at market price (about half of par) the
court said that "it would be unfair to the common stockholders to value the debtor's assets on
the assumption that Cuba will not meet its obligations.' In re Warren Brothers Co., 39 F.
Supp. 381, 385 (Mass., 1941).
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curity (e.g., a $ioo par value preferred share). Unless contractual priorities are to be dismissed entirely someone has to decide whether in
his opinion a proposed allocation of reorganization currency is fair to
the classes of claimants. Such a subjective judgment cannot be avoided;
at best an effort can be made to hedge it about by formulating additional official guides for making an allocation. These, along with the
guides for determining reorganization value, become the standard for a
fair and equitable plan. For convenience of analysis we are treating
the two sets of guides separately. Under reorganization doctrine they
are interrelated, and to be fair and equitable a plan must comply with

both.
The prevailing allocation guides collectively are designated the absolute priority standard. They purport to call for strict enforcement of
security contracts as qualified by the premises contained in the reorganization value concept. In theory the contractual priorities affecting
the rights of creditors and shareholders are to be recognized in full.
Senior claimants are supposed to be completely compensated, which
includes being given equitable compensation for loss of any valuable
rights, before junior claimants are permitted to receive anything of
value. Compensation to the seniors may be incorporated in the new
securities or take some other form. In any case the new bundle of
rights and claims allocated to them are supposed to be the equitable
equivalent of their old packet. 2 The worth of the new securities is not
to be tested by reference to market quotations because that yardstick

is patently inconsistent with predicating the plan on reorganization
The main precepts of our absolute priority standard are contained in the following decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308
U.S. io6 (1939); Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Group of
Institutional Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); RFC v. Denver &R.G.W.R.
Co., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
The priority which is referred to by the phrase "absolute priority" comprehends all kinds
of prior rights and claims. Particular emphasis, especially in Chapter X proceedings and to a
lesser extent in Section 77 proceedings, is placed on the priority of rights in case of default or
liquidation. The priorities of creditors and preferred shareholders on liquidation are treated as
matured for purposes of the reorganization proceedings. The reason underlying this approach
is that reorganization is viewed as a substitute for enforcement of rights through liquidation.
'"Reorganization prevents creditors from getting the cash for which they bargained, but the
absolute priority doctrine comes to their rescue by giving them the nearest practical equivalent." Dissolution Preferences and Public Utility Holding Company Act Simplifications-The
Otis Case, 58 Harv. L. Rev., 6o4, 6o8 (.945). But in determining whether seniors are completely compensated in a reorganization, the absolute priority doctrine seems to require that attention be paid to all their prior rights, including claims on income and rights to control the management of the enterprise.
A fuller understanding of the absolute priority standard might be gained by contrasting it
with the "investment value" standard developed under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. See note 49 infra.

HeinOnline -- 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581 1949-1950

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

values.2"

Instead their worth presumably is to be gauged by assuming
that the corporation's market value has come up to its reorganization
value or soon will do so.24 The stage for formulating a fair plan thus
23 It would be possible, for example, to decide what the capitalization of a company is to be
after reorganization and issue of enough of the new securities to senior creditors to give them a
package having a market value equal to the nominal amount of their claims. An article
written shortly after the enactment of Section 77B seems to endorse this approach. "[C]reditors
are entitled not merely to priority but to payment. Since they cannot be paid in cash, they
should be paid, so far as the resources of the company permit, in securities having the value of
cash. Although the corporate assets may have an appraised value in excess of the amount of
the debts, the total market value of securities issued against these assets may be far less than
that amount." Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganization Act, 48 Harv. L.
Rev. 39, 77 (1934). Such an approach, which in effect would replace appraised reorganization
value with market value, is far different from that now used (which is described in note 24
infra).
The difference between full compensation under a fair plan of reorganization and full payment of claims in cash or its equivalent is pointed up in an interesting and unusual fashion in
Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Chase National Bank, 194 N.Y. Misc. 628, 86 N.Y.S.
2d 505 (1949). In the reorganization of the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad the senior
bondholders were compensated in full by new securities in the reorganized company. The old
senior bonds had been secured by certain accommodation collateral that had not been within
the jurisdiction of the reorganization court because it was not an asset of the debtor company.
After completion of the reorganization proceedings the disposition of this collateral was put
in issue. The old junior bondholders, who participated in the reorganization as the marginal
class, which was compensated only in part, claimed the value of the released collateral on the
ground that the old senior bondholders were already made whole in the reorganization. But
the court awarded the value of the collateral to the old seniors, reasoning that "the pledge
[of the collateral] was made under a contract which guaranteed full payment of the [senior]
bonds ... actually and not merely fictionally and constructively." Ibid., at 632-33 and 51o.
24 On this matter the position of the SEC under Chapter X has been stated to be: "[S]enior
security holders are entitled to receive more than mere paper securities of a face value amount
equal to their claims; ... the securities they receive should be such as to give them really compensatory treatment for their claims. In other words, the new securities should be intrinsically
sound, so that there is a reasonable prospect that they will have values equal to their face
amounts, or in the case of stocks, equal to the values put upon them for reorganization purposes." Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
317, 340 (z94I)Compare the foregoing statement with the following description of the principle imputed to
the ICC in reorganizations under Section 77 prior to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
reorganizations of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad and the Western
Pacific Railroad:
, "However-and this is a vitally important corollary-zoo% satisfaction is deemed to be
given by zoo% satisfaction in paper. Priorities are considered satisfied if the full amount of
the claim is recognized in securities of the appropriate dollar amount. No attempt has been
made to insist that the securities issuable to a senior class must have a prospective market
value of zoo cents on the dollar before a junior class may participate. Indeed, in those few
instances where senior interests have asked for more than ioo%in new securities to compensate
for sacrifices entailed in receiving partial compensation in income bonds or stock, such treatment has been denied.
"The Commission has even gone further. It has not insisted upon allocations which would
reasonably assure that the securities issuable to senior interests should attain a market value
of zoo cents on the dollar before any income of the reorganized company could be paid to
junior interests." Friendly & Tondel, The Relative Treatment of Securities in Railroad Reorganizations under Section 77, 7 Law & Contemp. Prob. 420, 423-24 (1940).
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has a complex backdrop. The seniors are supposed to be compensated
in full, but only in terms of reorganization currency which generally
is not immediately convertible into dollars except at large discounts.
The juniors are supposedly entitled to the excess, if any, of reorganization value over and above the amount needed to satisfy claims of the
seniors. Interaction between these two guides is at the core of our absolute priority standard.
The main source of friction in this interaction is not difficult to locate. Reorganization value by hypothesis should equal the new capitalization of the rehabilitated enterprise. The new capitalization by definition equals the aggregate of nominal values assigned to the new securities (i.e., the amount of reorganization currency). Therefore the
total nominal value of the new securities should equal reorganization
value. The new securities are to be allocated among the participating
classes of creditors and stockholders. Superficially it might seem that
the juniors should receive the difference between the total nominal
amount of senior claims and the reorganization value. But this formula
assumes that the seniors receive new paper thought to be equivalent in
quality, as well as in nominal quantity, to their old holdings. In most
situations that arrangement would undermine the rehabilitation operation by preserving fixed charges that are heavy in relation to estimated earnings. The statutory requirement that a plan be feasible as
well as fair usually necessitates a more or less drastic scaling down of
such obligations and this ordinarily can be accomplished only by reducing the quality of paper allocated to the seniors. Compensation for
the deterioration usually can be provided only by giving the seniors
a sum of reorganization currency greater than the aggregate nominal
amount of their old claims. When this is done the balance of reorganization currency left for the juniors is concomitantly decreased.
These mathematics of reorganization explain why junior classes frequently insist that a large proportion of reorganization paper be debt
obligations. They also indicate why juniors often seek to introduce
unique features into the paper earmarked for seniors in the hope that
such features will be counted as compensation for other rights given up
by the seniors. 5 It is at these points that the conflict among the spar2S "Counsel and securityholders wrestling with the implications of [the Supreme Court's
opinion in Group of Institutional Investors v. Milwaukee R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (I943)] in
pending cases are trying, by a 'flash of genius,' to find some new 'qualitative' type of compensation which is not 'normally common.' It has been suggested that an abnormally high
sinking or purchase fund, payable out of earnings as a condition precedent to the payment
of dividends upon the new common stock allotted to old junior creditors and to be applied
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ring classes of security holders runs into what is considered to be an
overriding public interest that the rehabilitation of distressed companies be soundly executed. The standard of feasibility for a plan is
supposed to protect this public interest and in doing so seems to place
additional limitations on the area within which a fair plan may be
worked out. The feasibility guides are still in the course of growth.26
As a minimum they include a prohibition against saddling the reorganized business with excessive fixed charges of any kind. In addition they
probably include a restriction on trimming new securities with rococo
qualities which tend to be misleading and make intelligent judgments
by investors more difficult. One might speculate whether our standard
of fairness could not itself be stretched to impose comparable limitations so that there would be no need for a separate requirement of
feasibility. There surely seems to be an element of unfairness in awarding seniors new securities which are unsound. But such doubts about
fairness are likely to be associated with a distrust of the valuation for
reorganization purposes. It would be awkward to accept a certain value
as fair and then label an allocation of securities unfair on the ground
that they are unsound though within the permissible capitalization. The
feasibility requirement at least seems to avoid what might appear to be
double-talk about fairness."T
The feasibility guides probably are not as effective in channelling
official discretion, and thus in shrinking the permitted latitude for negotiation 28 among the claimants, as might be inferred from a separate
to the purchase or retirement of the inferior grades of securities allotted the old senior creditors, might suffice." Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 037, 1193, at 1212 (1943).
26See Philadelphia and Western Ry. Co., 13 S.E.C. 330 (I943); cf. In the matter of Philadelphia and Western Ry. Co., 51 F. Supp. 129 (Pa., 194 3 ). The concept of a feasible plan should
be compared with the standards of a sound corporate capital structure developed under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. See in particular Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444
(i939); El Paso Electric Co., 8 S.E.C. 366, 383 (1940)Z7Whether or not the fairness notion could be made to do the work of the feasibility notion,
the idea of feasibility can be separated out from allocation problems for purposes of analyzing
a plan. And there is no doubt that analysis is facilitated by such a separation.
The relationship between the "fairness" of a valuation for reorganization purposes and the
"fairness" of an allocation of securities under that valuation is more readily observed in ("horizontal") plans in which the same class of new security is divided between junior and senior participants. But the relationship is also present in some ("vertical") plans in which senior participants are given a higher ranking security than that given to junior participants. See the
discussion in part V of the text.
28 The term "negotiation" is used in this article as having a very broad meaning. It comprehends every kind of legitimate activity by which security holders or their representatives try
to convince the court or administrative agency or trustee that a distressed business should be
handled in a particular fashion or that a reorganization plan should embody one arrangement
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study of them. Their impact seems attenuated by the opportunity of
the parties to deal simultaneously with both reorganization value and
the composition of the new capital structure. It is to be expected that
courts and administrative agencies have not advertised how the interdependency of these two matters has affected the outcome of particular
cases. To do so might cast suspicion on the objective appearance of the
subjective judgments involved in calculating reorganization value and
in determining whether senior classes have been compensated completely for loss of rights. But in the give and take of negotiation two
controversial matters so closely related are almost inevitably linked
together. A good case for testing this observation is presented when
the likely range of reorganization value runs from a low which eliminates the juniors entirely to a high which allows them a relatively small
participation.2 9 The bargaining position of the seniors is apt to be very
strong and that of the juniors correspondingly weak. It is a pretty safe
bet that the juniors must either accept an arrangement which gives the
seniors the protection demanded or run the risk of having the court
hold that their stake in the company is so speculative as to make it
undesirable and unfair to grant them participation.
rather than others. It also includes dealings among different classes of security holders and
their representatives to reach agreement concerning any phases of a plan. From this description of the term it should be plain that negotiation is involved even where the actual plan is
drawn up by the ICC under Section 77. No distinction is drawn in the text between direct
negotiation among classes of security holders or their representatives, and the more indirect
form which centers on persuading the authorities in charge of the reorganization. "Negotiation" is intended to include both.
For a statement of the need for and the importance of vicarious negotiation in reorganizations, see Foster, Review of Lowenthal, The Investor Pays, 43 Yale L. J. 352, 357 (1934)29Two cases which arose under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act are highly useful in connection with this portion of the analysis. The first is In re Hopkins Lake Drive Realty Corp.,
C.C.H. Bkcy. L. Serv. 3276 (D.C. Md., 1934), in which the senior claims (adjusted) totalled
approximately $goS,ooo and valuations of the assets ranged from about $8ooooo to $i,ooo,ooo.
After noting that $gooooo "is possibly the best figure," the court rejected both the plan proposed by the seniors and that offered by the junior interest. As to the latter the court remarked: "In solving the question of insolvency in favor of the debtor [i.e., the junior interest]
I do not think I am at liberty to enforce on the bondholders against their will the sacrifice
of any part of their claim, either principal or interest. Equity and fairness require the debtor
corporation to discharge all of its original obligations which were incurred in good faith."
Concerning the plan of the seniors the court said: "The plan.., is not fair because it does not
take into consideration any equity in the debtor."
The second case is In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F. 2d 941, 942 (C.A. 2d, x935), in which
senior claims totalled about $sooooo and the "properties were assessed at $540,ooo." The precise issue raised in the case cannot arise under Chapter X, but both the broader problem posed
by the facts, and the discussion in the opinion, are of current interest.
30 "After having determined the total capitalization the ICC must provide fair and equitable compensation for all senior creditors upon the 'strict priority' theory. In a situation where
this distribution leaves only enough to partially compensate a junior group, the threat that
this junior group would reject the plan could [in the absence of an effective cram-down power]
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The effectiveness of the allocation and feasibility guides in controlling the discretion of officials might be further affected by whether our
standards are construed to sanction only one or more than one acceptable plan in any particular case. It has usually been thought that in
most situations a number of fair plans can be formulated within the
confines of feasibility. Moreover there has been a reluctance to rank
possible plans according to degrees of fairness probably because the
notion of fairness would tend to become unmanageable. 1 But a strong
argument can be made that the theory of reorganization dictates that
there can be only a single fair allocation for any particular situation."
In large. measure the reorganization process was designed to preserve
for juniors the greatest possible amount of value consistent with both
full compensation for seniors and adequate protection of the public
interest as reflected in the canons of feasibility. To accomplish this objective, the fair allocation must be that arrangement which gives juniors
maximum participation within such limits. It must therefore be the
plan which compensates seniors qualitatively to the fullest extent practicable in order to minimize the need for compensating them quantitatively and thereby increasing their nominal interests in the company.
There is as yet no clear indication that this view of the fair plan has
gained official sanction. But its approach to fairness doubtless explains
in part why courts are sympathetic to plans which emphasize qualitative compensation to seniors.
completely stall the reorganization. To prevent such an impasse the ICC might reasonably be
tempted to adjust the valuation in such a way as to eliminate completely marginal classes
which otherwise would be admitted to partial participation." Confirmation of Plan under
Section 77 over Vote of Dissenting Class of Creditors, i4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 84, 91 (1946).
31Remarks by courts indicate that degrees of fairness among plans might be recognized*
An example is the statement in In re Lower Broadway Properties, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 6i, 618
(N.Y., 1945), that Chapter X "does not require of the court to find the fairest plan conceivable but only that the plan proposed be fair." The SEC sometimes gives the impression of
rating the fairness or unfairness of plans or particular provisions in them by its use of such
adjectives as "grossly unfair," "obviously inequitable," or merely "unfair." See, for instance,
Central States Electric Corp., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 82 (1949).
32 This position seems to be taken in Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization under
Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1209 (i943). "Equitable
compensation must be made for rights which senior creditors are thus compelled to surrender.
So far as permitted by feasibility and the public interest, such compensation should be made
'qualitatively,' i.e., be incorporated in the new securities themselves. Insofar as feasibility and
the public interest prevent the relative priorities being made whole 'qualitatively,' they must
be made whole, and equitable compensation for surrendered rights must be made, 'quantitively'-i.e., by giving to the old senior creditors new securities of the same classes as those
given old junior claims but upon terms sufficiently more favorable than those given the junior
claims." Another article which might be read as suggesting this position is Guthmann, Absolute
Priority in Reorganization, 45 Col. L. Rev. 739 (1945).
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This approach to fairness also highlights the role that feasibility
guides can be made to play. The single fair plan idea means, in effect,
that the plan should push to the limits of feasibility whenever necessary
to protect the juniors. To the extent the idea influences those who draft
and pass upon plans, the feasibility issue becomes the active center of
controversy between participating classes. A two-directional relationship between fairness and feasibility is brought into focus. As a plan
is thought to exceed the limits of feasibility it tends to seem unfair to
seniors. As a plan is thought to fall short of the limits of feasibility it
tends to seem unfair to juniors. In this sense it might be said that in
reorganization doctrine fairness and feasibility are merely two different
impressions of the same panorama.
Having completed an excursion into absolute priority a reminder and
a question are in order. The absolute priority standard consists of
guides for distributing reorganization currency among classes participating in a reorganization. Would adoption of another set of allocation
guides, appropriately named, make any appreciable difference in the
reorganization process? A change of guides would not lessen the need
for making subjective judgments about the fairness of proposed allocations. Pressure and negotiation accordingly would continue to shape
reorganization plans. Any change wrought by the new guides would
simply be a shift in the permissible range for negotiation resulting from
a changed effectiveness of the guides in confining official discretion
about the fairness of plans. The absolute priority guides are said to be
more effective than alternatives which have been suggested. 3 This view
is plausible insofar as the existing guides can be articulated in a form
that sounds very narrow and precise. A more decisive answer to the
question does not seem possible. Even if the guides were changed no
method would be available for measuring the relative effectiveness of
the old and new in limiting official discretion. In any event, increased
solicitude about guiding allocations might be counteracted by relaxed
application of the guides for setting reorganization values.
33 In arguing in favor of the absolute priority doctrine in reorganizations, as contrasted
with some form of "relative priorities" doctrine, the government (including the SEC and ICC)
has stated: "Finally, we direct the attention of the Court to the stimulus which uncertainty
as to relative rights gives to obstructionist tactics. If the basis for the treatment of contract
rights is unsettled, reorganization ceases to be an orderly process of allocating assets in accordance with priorities. Instead it becomes a process of haggling, in which endurance challenges
legal position." Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. Io6 (939), brief for the
United States as amicus curiae at 22.
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IV
Financial distress of an industrial enterprise always focuses attention
on what should be done with the business. Should it be continued in
operation, sold as a going concern, scrapped, or disposed of in some
other way? Even without the intervention of our reorganization system
this question often is attended by many complications. There may be
differences of opinion among those who have invested in the company.
Fights for control are apt to develop. Sometimes the group in the saddle
may have no equity in the entity under existing market values, and
therefore it struggles to keep the company going. Not infrequently
efforts are made to end a conflict by a compromise that transfers rights
in the business from junior to senior interests. A need for additional
capital to keep the company in operation may color the situation and
influence the bargaining positions of the parties. These are only a few
of the more common complications which might affect the disposition
of a distressed business.8 4
None of the complications disappears when our reorganization system is introduced into the affairs of a company in trouble. On the contrary the goal of a fair plan based on reorganization value adds a new
dimension of complexities in deciding whether the business is to be sold
or reorganized and, if the company is to be reorganized, in deciding
what plan of reorganization is to be adopted. 5 To protect their own
interests the creditors and shareholders who continue to have a financial stake in the company will want to make these determinations.
34 The discussion in this portion of the article is limited to industrial corporations which can
be reorganized under Chapter X and does not cover railroad reorganizations under Section 77.
The sale-versus-reorganization issue is unlikely to arise in connection with railroads, and if it
were to be present it would be complicated by the public utility aspect of the operation of a
railroad.
35There is no clear line of demarcation between a sale and a reorganization. Where someone who has had no interest in the distressed business acquires it by putting up new money
which is distributed to those who have an interest in the business, the transaction is obviously
a sale. Where no new money enters the arrangement and the interests in the company are reallocated among the old investors, the transaction is obviously a reorganization. Between these
two clear-cut cases there are many variations and it might be difficult to classify realistically a
few transactions which could be posited. But nothing is likely to turn on classification in the
close cases. The terms "sale" and "reorganization" are useful primarily in connection with
an analysis such as the one undertaken in this article, and precise definition of these terms is
unnecessary for that purpose. It should be noted, however, that an arrangement which fundamentally is a sale can take the form of a reorganization. An example of this relationship is presented where an outsider first buys up the claims of juniors and then proposes a reorganization
plan under which he, as holder of the junior securities, will pay off the senior obligations in
full. In this situation the arrangement could be indifferently embodied in either a sale plan or
a reorganization plan.
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Decision by majority vote is to be expected in a democratic society;
it preserves the voluntary appearance of the process and may act to
check abuse of authority by officials. But not all questions can be left
to the vote of competing classes of claimants. They obviously cannot
decide which of their numbers are and are not to have a vote when
there is a disagreement on that very issue. Nor can participating classes
be depended upon to resolve their differences as to disposition of the
business without going beyond the boundaries of feasibility. The authority given the majority of a class to bind its minority members
makes it all the more necessary for some disinterested outsider to arbitrate these clashes of interests. Under our statutory scheme the disinterested party is either the reorganization judge or a combination of the
judge and an administrative agency.
The determination of which classes of creditors and shareholders
shall have a voice in formulating the program of rehabilitation is
treated under reorganization doctrine as a function of reorganization
value. All classes whose claims, taken in the order of their priority and
at their nominal amounts, fit within the reorganization value are considered as having a stake in the business. Accordingly these groups are
allowed to participate through appropriate representation in drawing
up the program and to vote upon it. The classes that are wholly eliminated by reorganization value are given more limited rights. To protect
their interests they must be able to take part in hearings concerned
with fixing that value, and have the right of appeal to correct irregularities or errors in the valuation process. Once reorganization value
has been properly established the groups eliminated by it should have
no further standing in the rehabilitation proceedings. Two exceptions
might be in order. Eliminated classes perhaps should be allowed to
demonstrate either that a change in conditions prior to completion of
the proceedings makes it reasonable to increase reorganization value
enough to accommodate them or that the business should be sold
instead of reorganized because an advance in market prices enables
them to share in the sale proceeds. We will return later to these possible exceptions.
More difficult is the problem of settling differences between classes of
participants as to disposition of the business or as to reorganization plans.
In many situations a number of plans can meet the fairness and feasibility standards as presently construed. Where one such plan is championed by senior security holders and another by juniors the reorgani-
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zation might be stymied unless one of the groups could be forced to
yield. Similarly there might be an impasse where one group favors a
given plan and the other class opposes it without coming forward with
an alternative fair and feasible plan. It was suggested earlier that the
dilemma could be avoided by reducing reorganization value just enough
to eliminate the marginal junior class from the enterprise. But this maneuver is questionable and in any event it seems to be manageable only
when a slight shift in reorganization value will turn the trick and there
is adequate evidence in the record to justify the lower value. In most
cases a more direct and flexible approach is needed. That need is filled
by the explicit or implicit power of the reorganization court to cram
down a fair and feasible plan upon a dissenting class of claimants."
It is this power which is at the root of judicial control over the ultimate
disposition of a company undergoing reorganization.
In theory it appears that the cram-down could be used against either
a senior or a junior class. In practice it is unlikely to be employed
against seniors. A judge understandably is apt to feel that the seniors
are making a greater sacrifice or have more at stake than the juniors
and therefore their plan is'entitled to greater weight than that endorsed
by the juniors. But courts not infrequently have threatened to use the
cram-down power in order to spur seniors into proposing a plan or into
adopting a more conciliatory attitude. 7 Moreover, it is not difficult to
envisage a situation in which a court might actually cram down on
uncooperative seniors a plan sponsored by juniors. A case in point is
presented when seniors want to sell the business at the current market
price while the juniors propose a plan of reorganization.
Such a case furnishes a helpful setting for further analyzing the internal relationship of the three principal aspects of reorganization doc36The term "cram down" is sometimes employed in a more limited manner than it is here.
Throughout this article it refers to the power of a reorganization court to force any dissenting
class into an arrangement which it refuses to accept voluntarily. The more limited usage confines the reference to the court's power to force a senior class into such an arrangement. See
Bankruptcy-Corporate Reorganization under Chapter X-Compeling Assent and Barring
Bad Faith Creditors, 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. ii

(195o).

The cram-down clause in subparagraph (e) of Section 77 is discussed at length in RFC v.
Denver &R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495 (1946). As to the power to cram down a plan on seniors
under Section 179 of Chapter X, see Country Life Apartments, Inc. v. Buckley, i45 F. 2d 935
(C.A. 2d, x944 ) .
37 One form of prodding is the threat to "put the debtor on the block" by transforming the
reorganization proceeding into an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding. In the case of a large
corporation which is thought to have going concern value the threatened course of action is
practically without meaning. Nevertheless the threat has frequently been made in both
equity receivership reorganizations and statutory reorganizations.
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trine: reorganization value; the fair and feasible plan; and control
over disposition of the business (with particular emphasis on how the
control is shared by the participants and the court). Where reorganization value cuts out all but one class of security holders, a disagreement among that class whether to sell or reorganize is like a family
fight in which a minimum of judicial intervention is needed. The court
clearly should make certain the sale market has been thoroughly canvassed so that the highest bid accurately reflects the market. In addition it has the duty to ascertain whether the votes are cast in good faith
and to disqualify any that are prompted by interests that conflict with
those arising from investment in the distressed business. With these exceptions it seems reasonable to rest the decision with the investors.
There might be occasions when the judge and his advisors believe that a
sale is preferable to a reorganization, or vice versa, or that the highest
bid so far received is too low, though the market has been well sampled.
It may be tempting for the court to impose its judgment by refusing
to approve one of the alternative plans or by preventing the investors
from voting to sell where the top bid seems unsatisfactory. Such moves
could be defended as necessary to protect investors-particularly where
there are many small investors-from their own folly in choosing a
course which seems imprudent. That sort of protection, nevertheless,
is incompatible with our belief in economic democracy. The court certainly should feel free to express its views and provide investors with
the opinions of experts. But in dealing with an industrial company no
consideration appears paramount to permitting those who have capital
already committed to decide whether to liquidate or reorganize."
31 If there were an even split in the class over whether the business should be sold or reorganized the court might have to settle the issue. It might be argued that the court should
favor reorganization because the investors who wish to sell can in effect do so by selling their
securities on the market. However, there may be a difference between the price for individual
sales of securities and the pro rata share of the price which could be obtained for the entire business. See i Bonbright, Valuation of Property 244-49 (1937)Not infrequently it is remarked that there is a public interest in having distressed industrial enterprises reorganized rather than sold. This assertion is difficult to handle unless its
reference and assumptions are made explicit. It seems unlikely that it refers to sale of a business
as a going concern inasmuch as the public has little interest in whether the company is run
by its old owners or by a new group which purchases the enterprise. If there were any public
interest here, it probably would be on the side of removing the management which has been
associated with the distress. More likely the assertion means that there is a public interest in
having a business continued in operation rather than sold for scrap. The assumption here
apparently is that no matter how inefficient or economically unnecessary the enterprise may
be, the public is benefited if the assets are maintained as a going concern. The error in this
proposition is so evident that an exposition of it is unnecessary. Possibly the remark is intended
to have a more limited sweep. It may mean only that the public has an interest in preventing
a hasty and ill-informed decision whether to maintain or scrap the enterprise. If so, there is no
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Where the controversy over sale or reorganization is not within a
single class but is between two classes, both of whose claims are or may
be accommodated within the reorganization value, the essence of the
problem under reorganization doctrine is different. Presumably the
seniors favor immediate liquidation at the prevailing market price while

the juniors insist upon either reorganization at a higher reorganization
value or a sale at not less than that value. Such a dispute between
classes best exposes the basic antagonism between the enforcement and

renegotiation pressures surrounding our corporate rehabilitation system. The dispute neatly frames the question whether seniors can deprive juniors of their "rights" under a fair plan built on reorganization
value by bringing about a sale at a lesser amount. It is a question which
goes to the nucleus of our reorganization system. Obviously it is one
which must be answered by the court and not by the contending parties.
The available procedure most suitable for resolving this question is
to have the court set as an upset price an amount below which it will
not approve a sale.39 There is a statutory requirement that the upset
price be "fair." No criteria of fairness are specified in the act but the
meaning of a "fair" upset price evidently is closely allied to the meaning
of a "fair" plan. On first impression it may seem that in reorganization

theory a fair upset price must always be reorganization value. 40 If it is
higher it is too harsh on the seniors; if it is lower it appears to deprive
juniors of the full measure of value which reorganization is designed
to give them. But this analysis is based on the erroneous assumption
that, in a reorganization, juniors are entitled to an amount of reorganization currency measured by the excess of reorganization value over
need to consider the point in this analysis of reorganization. Under Chapter X the decision
whether to scrap or operate is accorded a proper place in the proceedings. See Cary, Liquidation of Corporations in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 6o Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1947). For a discussion of the importance of the reorganization-versus-liquidation (as scrap) issue see Buchanan, The Economics of Corporate Enterprise, c. xiv (194o). Note particularly the shortcomings
in the procedure provided by the equity receivership reorganization for deciding this issue.
s9 Section 216(7) of Chapter X, 52 Stat. 896 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 616(7) (1946); cf. Section 77(b)(5), 48 Stat. 912 (I934).
40 In the Keeshin Freight Lines reorganization the SEC appeared to equate a fair upset
price with reorganization value (which it termed "going concern value"). In analyzing a plan to
liquidate the company at not less than a certain upset price, the SEC commented: "But unless
liquidation value is greater than going concern value, it is manifest that its use deprives creditors and shareholders of the full measure of value which is rightfully theirs." Keeshin Freight
Lines, Inc., SEC Corp. Reorg. Release No. 78 (z949). The Commission then went on to determine what it believed was a fair reorganization value, making no distinction between a fair
value for reorganization purposes and for upset price purposes. The absence of such a distinction probably was not merely an oversight, in view of the fact that the Commission was
simultaneously rendering advisory reports on both a plan of sale and a plan of reorganization.
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the total nominal claims of seniors. The fallacy of ignoring the quality
of the paper allocated to the seniors has already been pointed out in
connection with the mathematics of reorganization. The share of reorganization value to which the juniors can lay claim under a fair plan
is the residue after seniors have been given the equitable equivalent of
their old rights. To equate fair upset price with reorganization value
is to confuse real money with reorganization currency. Only in the
former and not in the latter does three dollars total value less two
dollars of senior claims necessarily leave a one dollar residue of value
for juniors.
These sets of relationships might suggest appropriate guides in fixing
an upset price. In the extreme they seem to indicate that a fair upset
price could not be ascertained without considering the real value of
reorganization currency the juniors would receive under a fair plan
whi*ch the court would be willing to cram down on them. They seem
to imply that the upset sum should provide the juniors with that amount
of real value in real dollars. When it is so viewed the upset price is
nothing other than one application of the cram-down apparatus. This
extreme characterization of the upset price probably is not to be found
in official discussions of the device; but courts doubtless have been
more or less aware of, and influenced by, the considerations which suggest that characterization." In fixing an upset price more than one
court has remarked that under it juniors are as well treated as they
could expect to be under a fair reorganization plan.
The sale-versus-reorganization issue 42 also offers an opportunity for
4'In some cases the recognition that fair upset price properly should be lower than reorganization value might be reflected in a disguised manner. For example, if a court believes
that a distressed company will be sold rather than reorganized, it might approve of a lower
going concern value than if it believes the concern will be reorganized. In doing so the court
might feel that it is dealing with an upset price and not a value for reorganization purposes.
There is a danger in making such a hidden adjustment. If efforts to sell fail, and reorganization
becomes the only practical alternative, the court might find that the approved valuation
cannot conveniently be adjusted upwards. It is interesting to compare the advisory report of
the SEC and the memorandum opinion of the court in the Keeshin Freight Lines reorganization. The SEC found a reorganization value of approximately $2,iooooo. The court, after

agreeing with the reorganization trustee that "a plan providing for a cash sale at or near the
enterprise value is the most advantageous to the creditors," reduced the reorganization value
to $r,7o0,ooo. In re Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 439 (11., 1949).
42An excellent case study of the reorganization-versus-sale question is furnished by the
Atlas Pipeline Corporation proceeding under Chapter X. The practical alternatives in the
case were to reorganize or to liquidate at scrap value. The advisory report of the SEC analyzes
the issue clearly and comprehensively. Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941). The opinion
of the reorganization court, which comments on the advisory report, reveals some of the practical factors which are at work in determining what disposition should be made of a distressed company. In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846 (La., 1941).
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exploring further the relationship between reorganization value and
market value. Because reorganization value is a fixed estimate of longterm average value it is not unusual to find, in our economically unstable economy, that as the future of the enterprise unrolls, its market
value at times is below reorganization value and at times above it.
Reorganization doctrine acknowledges the possibility of market value
climbing above reorganization value. Nevertheless, such an occurrence
may be troublesome. If it takes place not long after a reorganization
has been finally consummated those who were eliminated from participation may feel especially aggrieved and press for legislation to reopen
the proceedings. Reorganization theory perhaps should not be concerned with these reactions. But it can hardly avoid being concerned
when a substantial advance in market value occurs after reorganization value has been fixed but before the proceedings have been terminated. Two possible developments need to be distinguished.
The first consists of a marked enhancement in market value, but not
to exceed reorganization value. Any such increase probably can be attributed to a change in a factor which was considered relevant in computing the reorganization value. Consequently, the change might lead
to a demand that reorganization value be reviewed and increased." For
example, if earnings of the business rise above those projected as an
average in calculating reorganization value, the marginal participating
class or an excluded class may argue that a new valuation is in order.
Such an argument alone is not persuasive under reorganization doctrine.
In estimating average earnings it must have been contemplated that
there would be fat as well as lean years. Unless a change in conditions
is reasonably likely to work a long-run and significant improvement in
the affairs of the company, an immediate upturn in earnings ought to
be ignored because already taken into account.
The second possible development is an advance in market values of
sufficient magnitude that the securities allocated (or to be allocated)
to the seniors sell above their nominal values. A marginal participating
or excluded junior class might attempt to utilize such an upturn in one
of two ways. It might try to reopen the valuation question by pointing
out that the market prices, which represent independent appraisals of
the company's future by investors, reveal the inadequacy of the reor43 The reorganization of the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad under Section 77
probably best illustrates this situation. See RFC v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328 U.S. 495
(1946); Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 329 U.S. 607 (1947).
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ganization value. 4 Or the class might try to end the reorganization
proceeding by paying off the seniors in full with new money raised by
the sale of new securities or otherwise.4 5 Courts are disposed to be
sympathetic to these efforts though the possibility of succeeding may
encourage junior classes to stall reorganizations in hopes of catching
a rising market. Permitting changes of the kind described prevents
seniors from obtaining what might be regarded as windfalls and appears
in harmony with the design of reorganization to prevent unnecessary
forfeitures by junior classes. But one limitation on the liberty extended
juniors seems desirable: at some point the reorganization process should
be treated as at an end, and all rights created under it should be deemed
irrevocably vested. 6
In looking into the relationship between market value and reorganization value we have noted how it might be thought to bear on deciding
whether a distressed business is to be sold or reorganized. To an extent
largely unknown, courts may consider the relationship in exercising
their ultimate control over disposition of the business where participating classes are in disagreement. It has been suggested by others,
however, that courts are motivated by a simpler line of reasoning:
Reorganization value is someone's guess as to what the value of the
business will be during "good times." The court adopts it to prevent
the juniors from being squeezed out at a lesser valuation. Thus reorganization value is always a kind of upset price; it is an upset price used
when reoganization rather than sale is to be the solution of the distress.
When courts believe we are at a low stage in the "business cycle" they
will approve of reorganization values and upset prices which are substantially above prevailing market price levels. When they believe we
are at a fairly high stage in the cycle, courts will refuse to endorse such
differentials. Under this explanation the critical factor in the reorgani44The United States Supreme Court in the second Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad case implied that such an event might be grounds for reopening a plan prior to completion of the reorganization proceedings. See particularly footnote 6 and the related portion of
the text of the majority opinion. Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co.,
329 U.S. 6o7, 617 (1947).
4SSee Knight v. Wertheim & Co., 158 F. 2d 838 (C.A. 2d, 1946).

46A

detailed discussion of this general problem is contained in Miller, Status of Economic

Interests in Proceedings Under Chapter X After Confirmation of the Reorganization Plan,
24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 707 (1949). The problem is pointed up by the efforts of juniors to keep
open the reorganization of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad under Section 77 in order to take advantage of proposed legislation which was being considered in
Congress. In re Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 155 F. 2d 489 (C.A. 7 th, 1946). See also In re
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 162 F. 2d 6o6 (C.A. 7th, 1947).
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zation process is the optimism or pessimism of the judge regarding the
economic future. He will permit a sale at market value if he believes
that conditions are not likely to improve markedly, but bar a sale,
through fixing a comparatively high upset price, if he feels that prosperity is not gone forever.
This simple explanation no doubt contains a significant element of
realism. Judges surely are influenced by their intuition concerning the
economic future just as all the expert guessers are so affected. But to
offer this as an adequate analysis of reorganization value and the upset
price is to assume that the whole procedure of reorganization is a sham.
If someone's intuition accounts for reorganization value it may as easily
account for all the other aspects of the process. There are people who
think or say that legal actions always are merely ceremonies to act out
or glorify decisions already made. Corporate reorganizations are especially singled out by them as illustrations of the point-apparently
because of the grandiose magnitudes involved." No one however has
yet shown that the ordinary corporate reorganization is any more or
less stagecraft than the mine-run tort action. To attempt demonstration
here that the reorganization process has a genuine foundation would be
foolhardy. Those who at this date are convinced that a typical tort
action is a sham are not likely to accept a different interpretation of a
reorganization. All others can appreciate a significant distinction. Reorganizations might be based on fictitious values and subjective judgments; but those who operate the process and accept its doctrines do
not think they are playing a game or acting under false pretenses.
V
Completion of the analysis of liquidation compared with reorganization enables us to return to the subject of fair and equitable plans,
and discuss another phase of it. Using reorganization value is a way of
inflating the putative value of a company beyond its market value. This
extra value is allocated among participants by means of a plan which
must be fair and feasible. The cram-down and upset-price apparatus
guard against maneuvers which might frustrate the inflation. The end
result fulfills the basic objective of reorganization: Junior interests receive something of value, out of the extra value, which would have been
denied them under a market-place regime. The value conferred on
juniors must be withdrawn or withheld from seniors but the intricacies
47 Compare

Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism, c. 1o (1937).
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of reorganization tend to obscure the route by which the transfer is
effectuated. We are now in a position to trace the course by which
extra value is redistributed through fair reorganization plans. For convenience we shall postulate that there are the practical alternatives of
selling distressed businesses at prevailing market prices or reorganizing
them. The reality of this proposition has already been discussed. To
expedite the analysis we shall also assume that sales at market prices
would afford no return to those juniors who could participate in reorganizations predicated on reorganization values.
Several varieties of reorganization plans usually can be formulated
in any particular case, but for our proximate purpose all plans may be
viewed as falling into two polar patterns. One consists of differentiating
between the junior class and the senior class by allocating to the juniors
only new securities which are subordinate to those allocated to the
seniors. This arrangement may be termed a "vertical" plan. The other
entails dividing a single issue of new securities between the juniors and
seniors. This may be called a "horizontal" plan.
In a horizontal plan it is evident that the extra value conferred upon
the juniors is initially taken from the seniors. Presumably the aggregate market prices of the securities in the new single issue approximates
the market value of the enterprise. A part of this enterprise market
value, the whole of which by our postulate would have belonged to the
seniors if the business had been sold, is immediately transferred from
the seniors to the juniors when they are given some of the new securities. But under reorganization doctrine this transfer is supposed only
to be a temporary loan. When the company attains its full reorganization value, through a sufficient increase in its market value, the doctrine assumes the seniors will have been repaid completely by the increase in value of their new securities. In a vertical plan it may not be
evident that any excess over market value conferred on the juniors is
taken or even merely initially "borrowed" from the seniors. It is sometimes suggested that the model vertical plan is one so constructed that
at the outset only the new senior securities have value while the new
junior securities are practically worthless. 8 Thereunder extra value
48 Describing the securities as "practically worthless" confuses analysis. If the securities
are wholly worthless at present, that means investors do not believe they have value now or
will have value in the foreseeable future; and if they are wholly worthless, it is senseless to
allocate mere pieces of paper to the juniors. If the securities have some worth at present, then
part of the total value of the enterprise is being given to the juniors, and the present value of
the securities reflects the judgment of investors as to their value in the future. A present low
value might indicate investors believe (among other possibilities) that the securities have a
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would seem not to be taken from the seniors, but to come into existence
only if and as the market value of the company increased. An illustration is furnished by a plan to issue common shares to the seniors and
to allot the juniors warrants to purchase such shares. If the warrants
are initially almost worthless they would acquire value as the market
value of the entity improved. As a corollary it might seem that exercise
of the warrants would not deprive the seniors of any value which had
been allotted to them.
But these analyses of vertical and horizontal plans are incomplete.
They ignore the risk of a further decline in the market value of the
business. If a sale at market value were permitted in place of a reorganization the seniors would actually receive a certain sum of money.
The purchaser would then bear the risk of a decline in value and stand
to gain the full benefit of an increase in value. By being forced into a
reorganization to protect the reorganization value "belonging to" the
juniors, the seniors are required to accept a position inferior to that
which a purchaser would voluntarily acquire at market price. The
seniors are compelled to bear the entire risk of decline but are given
only a fractional share of any improvement. This is equally true of
vertical and horizontal reorganization plans, though in the latter the
risk of deterioration may deceptively appear to be divided between the
juniors and seniors. To the juniors the decline would be merely a reduction in the value initially transferred to them from the seniors when
reorganization value was substituted for market value in the enforcement of rights. To the seniors the decline would be a further real loss
in their investment as measured by market values.
VI
There remains for consideration the ultimate question about our
reorganization system: Is a fair plan a just plan? One approach to this
problem has already been explored in part. It consists of explaining why
the market apparatus is inadequate in reorganizations and then arguing that a fair plan based on reorganization value simulates the results
an adequate market would reach. The assumptions and weaknesses of
this treatment of the question have been indicated. Three other approaches, which do not necessarily assume anything about the adequacy of the market, invite attention.
chance, but only a slight one, of having a great value in the future. If that chance materializes
it cannot be said the increase in value was not taken into account by investors in initially appraising the securities.
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The first seeks to defend the justness of a fair plan in terms of the
reasonable expectations of the parties to security contracts. In our society, it has been argued, senior claimants are predominantly interested
in receiving the income for which they have contracted. All the protective devices contained in the contracts, including rights on default, are
merely ancillary to the receipt of income from the investments. Reorganization by means of a fair plan is only another method of making
that income available to the seniors. It therefore does no more than
carry out the primary intentions of the parties and satisfy their reasonable expectations.49 Strict enforcement of default provisions at market
prices causes perverse results. It would distort the contractual scheme
by placing rights on default ahead of the right to receive income. Moreover, a fair-plan reorganization upon default has for all practical purposes replaced other means of "enforcing" the claims of seniors. In
making their investments the seniors accordingly should have understood that the rules for reorganization automatically became terms of
the contracts.
The rhetoric of this argument may be appealing, but the logic is not
without a flaw. In part there seems to be confusion of cause and effect.
The right to income appears to be of paramount importance to investors
partly because our system of corporate rehabilitation has stressed that
right above all others. Similarly, reorganization under a fair plan is to
be expected upon default because that is the treatment we have prescribed. To the extent such circularity is present this approach has the
weakness of justifying a fair plan reorganization by the fact that it,
rather than some other procedure, has been authorized by law.
The second approach attempts to support the justness of fair plan
reorganizations by pointing to the widespread endorsement of that sys49 The emphasis on the income factor in reorganizations may have been further stimulated
by the approach of the SEC in simplification plans under the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. See Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624 (,945).
The similarity between the guides for compensating seniors under a Chapter X reorganization and under a PUHCA simplification calls for further comment. Both sets of guides are
viewed as being part of the absolute priority, doctrine. This means that under both sets contractual priorities are to be recognized and higher ranking claimants are to be equitably compensated before lower ranking claimants are awarded anything. The basic difference between
the two is that a reorganization is treated as a substitute for liquidation, and therefore as an
occasion for the maturing of default rights, while a simplification is treated as not maturing
such rights. Consequently, in a simplification seniors are entitled to the equitable equivalent
of the value of their securities as constituted immediately before simplification or, stated in
another manner, the investment value of such securities; while in a reorganization seniors are
not only entitled to the value of their securities immediately preceding reorganization, but to
the equitable equivalent of their entire position, including that part of it which arises from
the maturing of their rights on default.
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tern by investors. Many senior security holders, especially institutional
ones, seem to approve strongly of reorganization under a fair plan.
In fact they frequently offer to renegotiate their security contracts
before the debtor company reaches a financial crisis so as to help it
ward off insolvency proceedings5 0 Sometimes they are willing to extend
maturity dates or accept other adjustments without demanding full
equitable compensation. Once an insolvency action has commenced
these investors often try to speed up the process in order to restore
regular income payments by the distressed business. From such observations it has been contended that a fair plan is a just plan because the
seniors themselves prefer it.
This contention may have merit but it comes close to asserting too
much. When told that seniors favor voluntary adjustment or the rapid
development of a fair plan, we must ask what alternatives are available
to them. They may prefer voluntary adjustment to statutory reorganization; or they may prefer a quick reorganization to a slow one. But
these preferences are not strong indications of how they would react
to strict enforcement of security contracts at market values if that
alternative were proffered. Furthermore, the contention readily lends
itself to regarding all seniors as having the same attitude as the archetype institutional investor. It is obvious that a uniform attitude is improbable in most cases. The wide variety of investors who purchase
senior securities surely do not have an identical hierarchy of interests.
To ignore the differences is to flirt with the dangerous assumption that
what a majority considers good is good for all members of its class.
In the renegotiation of security contracts it has long been recognized
that an uninformed majority of a class may need protection from an
aggressive minority. But of equal importance is the point that every
minority may need protection from the majority of its class. Otherwise
so The attitude of the archetype institutional investor might be reflected in the provisions
of the Railroad Modification Law of 1948, 62 Stat. 162 (1948), 49 U.S.C.A. 73 (Supp. 195o).
Under the law a specified majority of a class can bind the minority to a renegotiation of their
security contracts though the debtor has not defaulted and no insolvency proceeding is imminent. The ICC must approve the plan but this feature does not alter the underlying authorization for renegotiation by majority rule prior to default. See Hand & Cummings, The Railroad
Modification Law of 7948, 48 Col. L. Rev. 689 (1948). It has been suggested that institutional
investors did not oppose the legislation because plans under it are likely to affect junior bondholders rather than senior bondholders, and the institutional investors are primarily interested
in the senior issues. But see In re Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 63 F. Supp. 542 (Md., 1945), for
the views of institutional bondholders as to the readjustment of certain Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad junior bonds under Chapter XV of the Bankruptcy Act. It has also been suggested
that institutional investors might have been willing to support the Railroad Modification
Law in order to avoid passage of legislation less favorable to them.
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we could simply dispense with our present notions of fairness and be
content to accept almost any plan to which the majority of each participating class would agree.
The third approach attempts to establish the justness of a fair plan
by linking reorganizations to our economic instability. In an economically stable society built on private property foundations the compulsory renegotiation of security contracts would likely be regarded as
both inexpedient and unjust. But in a highly unstable economy such as
ours the instability may be the most significant factor in forming public
policy as to enforcement or renegotiation of contracts. To some extent
the instability probably affects the expectations of the contracting parties. But regardless of their actual or presumed expectations the society
may wish to alter their deals to adjust for violent economic fluctuations
which it permitted. To attenuate ramifications of a great downswing,
for example, the society may refuse to enforce strictly certain types of
contracts. The attitudes which result in such a move can at best be only
vaguely articulated. It can be said that the society will hesitate to enforce strictly those contracts which turn out to be unduly harsh for
large numbers of persons. Or it can be said that if a bargain proves to
be too good there will be reluctance to enforce it literally and thereby
confer a windfall upon a fortunate but not necessarily deserving party.
In the case of security contracts this general feeling may be reinforced
by another circumstance. The instability of the economy is itself aggravated by the efforts or willingness of seniors to minimize their risks by
concentrating all risks on the juniors. 5 ' Knowing the economy is unstable, the seniors may be asking too much of the juniors when they
contract for them to accept not only the risk of loss from operations of
their businesses, but also risk of loss through a deterioration in general
economic conditions to which the contracts contribute.
s,Reorganization proceedings are commenced in times of high economic activity as well as
in depressed times, although the former group of cases is relatively small in number. It might
be expected that in nondepression proceedings there perhaps will be greater emphasis on
liquidation or sale rather than reorganization and greater caution in finding a reorganization
value substantially in excess of market value. Where financial distress of an enterprise is not
paralleled by general economic distress, the usual arguments about the market as a poor
governor of values seem out of place. Consider, for example, the current Chapter X proceeding to reorganize the Tucker Corporation, which became insolvent at a time when the automotive industry and the country generally were enjoying a very high level of economic activity.
1950). It is not unlikely
In the matter of Tucker Corp., Docket No. 4 8-B-5 3 o (N.D. Ill.,
that courts are influenced by the economic environment surrounding financial distress even if
their reported opinions do not discuss the matter.
52 "What is less clearly apprehended is the aggravated instability of the whole economy,
and the obstacle to deliberate monetary stabilization, which corporate debt structures pro-
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In our society it may not be manifestly just to allow or compel rene-

gotiation of security contracts but it may be more unjust to enforce
such contracts strictly and thereby let widely fluctuating market values
govern the rights of the parties. Renegotiation through reorganization
under a fair plan based on reorganization value may be the least unsatisfactory adjustment to economic instability. This perhaps is the
most persuasive justification for our system of corporate reorganiza-

tion. But the effects and accomplishments of the system should not be
overstated. At most the system results in what is thought by many
to be a more equitable way of adjusting rights among those who have a
financial interest in distressed companies. Beyond this its demonstrable
reach is almost negligible. Its bearing on the instability of the economy
has been the subject of inconclusive argument. Some have urged that

the system might act as a brake on serious downward movements
through warding off wholesale liquidations of corporate securities by

investors in anticipation of foreclosures at depressed market prices.
With equal if not greater force others have reasoned that such foreclosures aid recovery from depressions by eliminating'old debts and
thereby providing a basis for new investment in the financially distressed enterprises. 3 In any event the net effect of the reorganization
system on economic instability is unlikely to be significant and the system cannot reasonably be rated as an important instrument for maintaining stability. Likewise the system has an indeterminate, but cer-

tainly a very slight, effect on the composition of the capital structures
of enterprises. By protecting junior interests in time of distress it might
duce in their aggregate. It should be obvious what desperate and frantic struggles for corporate
liquidity mean in total where the economy has slipped into general recession which, debt
structures apart, might prove innocuous and short-lived. They may well mean the difference
between a mild recession and a precipitous, catastrophic deflation." Memorandum prepared
by Henry C. Simons, quoted in Groves, Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress 33-34
(1946). For a broader consideration of the effect of debt on the economy see Fisher, Booms
and Depressions (1932).
s "Bankruptcy, business failures and foreclosures in depressions of the past may not have
been 'just' but they probably did contribute to recovery. When the old owner was wiped out
and the creditor became the owner, the debt was wiped out and there was a basis for new
savings to flow into investment in the form of debt ....Bankruptcy as a corrective for overindebtedness of the economy is tending to decline .... [P]ublic opinion appears to have been
becoming progressively less sympathetic with, or tolerant toward, foreclosure.... Thus, the
incubus of debt remains largely intact, and there is a reduced basis for new savings flowing into
investment. Bankruptcies and foreclosures in the heyday of the free enterprise system wiped
out not equities but debt, and were an important contribution to turn from depression to
prosperity, and to affording a basis for financing the prosperity." Jones, Investment Prospects,
2 J. Finance IS,24 (x947). To the extent the reorganization system replaces foreclosure at
market value with adjustment at reorganization value it apparently contributes to this trend.
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make equities somewhat more attractive to investors in general. But
this very protection might encourage corporate directors, elected by
junior interests, to indulge in heavier debt financing than they would
sanction absent the protection. In no other respect can the reorganization system be made to appear as an aid to implementing sound
monetary and fiscal policy designed to promote economic stability and
well-being.5" In the end its most significant aspect for society as a whole
may be a negative one: The junior interests who are relieved by it from
the judgments of the market are rescued without the direct disbursement of public funds for their benefit.
S4One minor qualification may be in order. It has been said that, as part of the broad program for building up confidence in the securities market by government supervision and related
actions, the reorganization system contributes to establishing conditions for increased useful
investment. This statement is open to at least three challenges. Is increased investment necessarily useful? Does so-called investor confidence result in more or less investment? Does the
reorganization system have any appreciable effect on the decision of a person to invest or not?
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